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COMPUTER MALPRACTICE: ARE COMPUTER
MANUFACTURERS, SERVICE BUREAUS, AND
PROGRAMMERS REALLY THE PROFESSIONALS
THEY CLAIM TO BE?
I. INTRODUCTION
A businessman, faced with the pleasant prospect of han-
dling a successful and expanding wholesale supply house, de-
cides that the time is right to install a sophisticated computer
system to handle more efficiently his inventory, billing, and
general accounting operations. Since he is not knowledgeable
about current computer technology, he contracts with an in-
dependent consulting firm specializing in data processing and
program design.1 After determining that a computer system is
feasible for the businessman's operations, the consultant ob-
tains the appropriate components from a manufacturer, su-
pervises their installation, and designs the operating program
to serve the client's business needs.
Several months after the computer is placed "on line,"
the businessman begins receiving letters from disgruntled
buyers about improper shipments and from impatient credi-
tors concerning unpaid bills. Further, improper inventory ac-
counts have resulted in the understocking of some items and
the overstocking of others. The problem is finally traced to
the computer "software" system, which is found to be too
small to handle the desired business functions.
In a second case, an independent insurance agent
C 1983 by Kevin S. MacKinnon
1. These firms are known as "computer service bureaus" and have been defined
as firms which "sell data processing services to businesses generally." Ass'n of Data
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 379 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). See J.C. Nahil, Small
Business Computers: A Beginner's Guide, COMPUTERS AND PEOPLE, Feb. 1978, at 7:
These firms are specialists who procure the best computer equipment
they can find, combine it with application programs that you need for
your business, then install the system and handle any related computer
chores you wish. Independent computer suppliers are more than just
vendors. They're a management resource, much like your CPA firm, law
firm, or investment counselor, helping you with your information man-
agement needs.
See generally Jordon, The Tortious Computer-When Does EDP Become Errant
Data Processing, [1972-79 Transfer Binder] 4 COMPUTER L. SERv. § 5-1, art. 2 (1972).
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searches for a solution to his data-processing problems. The
insurance agent contracts with a computer manufacturer to
purchase a computer. The manufacturer also designs and sells
computer systems, programming, and services. After installa-
tion of the system, the manufacturer operates the system
while training the insurance agent's personnel. Several
months later, the computer manufacturer departs, having
completed the training. It later becomes apparent that the
system is failing to perform as expected, and in fact commits
errors with such frequency that the insurance agent finds him-
self embroiled in litigation and faced with a sharp decline in
profits. The errors are ultimately traced to a negligently
designed computer software system lacking sufficient controls
to deal with a program malfunction.
This comment examines whether consumers of computer
services like those in the above illustrations have a cause of
action in tort against a computer manufacturer or service bu-
reau for computer malpractice. This cause of action is based
upon the reliance which the consumer must place on the ex-
pert judgment and experience of those who sell and service
computers. The comment investigates the need for malprac-
tice protection. The author concludes that such protection is
needed and that plaintiffs should have a cause of action in
tort.
IT. THE PUBLIC NEED FOR COMPUTER MALPRACTICE
PROTECTION
A. Growth of the Industry
The evolution and phenomenal growth of the computer
industry in the last forty years2 has been one of unbridled ex-
pansion.' Commentators have remarked that the United
2. In 1942, the Atarrosoff-Berry computer, which is generally acknowledged to
be the first digital computer, went into operation for the U.S. Government. M.
HOLDIEN, COMPUTERS AND THEIR SOCIETAL IMPACT 38-40 (1977). General Electric
Company made the first commercial use of a computer in 1954. W. FUORI, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE COMPUTER 42 (2d ed. 1977).
3. J. Paul Lyet, chairman and chief officer of UNIVAC, has drawn the analogy
that if aviation had grown with the speed of data processing, less than a year would
have separated the Wright brothers' flight at Kitty Hawk from Neil Armstrong's walk




States had quietly entered a "second Industrial Revolution, 4
an "information age"'5 based on data processing and computer
systems.
Today, there are more than one million computers in use
in the United States.' The commercial potential of early com-
puters was limited by their large size and operating expense.
The growth in commercial use of computers is due, in part, to
a series of technological advancements which have greatly in-
creased the machines' capabilities while reducing their overall
size. A computer which in 1956 needed 10,000 cubic feet of
floor space, today requires only ten cubic feet for the same
computing operations, and theoretically can be further re-
duced to the size of a typewriter.8
The computer's speed is also vastly improved. Whereas
the early computers performed 300 instructions per second,
today's large computers are capable of executing 100 million
instructions per second.8 Perhaps most importantly, comput-
4. "Computer technology is the cornerstone of the Second Industrial Revolu-
tion." Lawlor, What Computers Can Do: Analysis and Prediction of Judicial Deci-
sions, 49 A.B.A.J. 337 (1963).
5. French, White House Advisors Urge National Information Policy, Cite
Merging Technologies, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 31, 1977, at 1, col. 3. See also Davis,
Evolution of Computers, SCIENCE, March 18, 1978, at 1099. The increased use of com-
puters is discussed in Bigelow, The Lawyer's Role in the Computer Age, [1972-79
Transfer Binder] COMPUTER L. SERv. § 1.1, art. 1, at 1-4. See generally Muller, Per-
sonal Computers in Home and Business Applications, COMPUTERS AND PEOPLE, Dec.
1977, at 11; Spangle, Minicomputers: Their Expanding Role, COMPUTERS AND PEOPLE,
Dec. 1976, at 16.
6. Three-fourths of the total number of computers are "minicomputers" which
cost less than $50,000. Smith, A Survey of Current Legal Issues Arising from Con-
tracts for Computer Goods and Services, COMPUTER L. J. 475, 475 n.1 (1979).
There has been especially rapid growth in the installation of small computer sys-
tems; 350,000 were installed in 1978 alone. McCartney, Small Business Systems:
They're Everywhere, DATAMATION, Oct. 1978, at 91.
7. The first models were made with thousands of vacuum tubes and demanded
a substantial amount of power for their operation. Some, such as the ENIAC, weighed
30 tons and required 1,500 square feet of floor space. Originally only the government
and some of the larger industrial corporations could afford to purchase them. D.
SANDERS, COMPUTERS IN Socim 8 (1973). See generally Rosen, Electronic Com-
puters: A Historical Survey, 1969 COMPUTING SURVEYS 7; E. TOMESKI, THE COMPUTER
REVOLUTION 17-18 (1970).
8. F. GRUENBERGER, COMPUTERS AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 10 (1975). For a
brief history of the three stages of computer development (the vacuum stage, the
transistor stage, and the integrated circuit stage), see Chandler, Computer Transac-
tions: Potential Liability of Computer Users and Vendors, 3 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 408-
11 (1977).
9. Medium to large computers are capable of one million executions per second
and the microcomputer can handle 250,000 executions per second. See F. GRUEN-
10671983]
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ing costs have dropped precipitously, being cut roughly in half
every two years.' 0 It has been estimated that one-third to one-
half of the gross national product of the United States is de-
rived from the production and distribution of information and
knowledge. 1 Computers have become big business in the
United States, and are rapidly becoming the business of the
nation. Over $50 billion was spent on data-processing goods
and services in 1979.12 In 1980 the top one hundred U.S.
based data-processing companies experienced a 20.4% growth
rate in revenues to $55.6 billion.'
Nowhere has the evidence of this growth rate been more
prevalent than in the field of "microcomputers," small com-
puter systems designed especially to handle the needs of
smaller businesses. Because of their low cost ($2,000 to
$10,000)," these small business systems have opened the door
to data-processing for businesses previously priced out of the
computer market, creating a tremendous demand.'5 Increasing
numbers of suppliers of small business systems have entered
BERGER, supra note 8, at 7. This increase in speed has been of such magnitude that
the fundamental units of measurement have had to change. First generation com-
puters were measured in milliseconds (thousandths of a second), second generation
computers dealt with microseconds (millionths of a second), while third and fourth
generation computers are measured in nanoseconds (billionths of a second). It is pre-
dicted that computers soon will operate at the speed of electricity (one foot per na-
nosecond). See D. SANDERS, supra note 7, at 59-60. Storage capacity (memory) has
also grown prodigiously from 2,000 words to over one million, and the capacity exists
to extend that amount as high as 500 billion to a trillion alphanumerical characters in
one computer. See D. SANDERS, supra note 7, at 60-61.
10. "In the late 1940's, one could purchase 600,000 executed instructions for
three dollars, whereas today one can purchase ten million instructions for a dollar."
Chandler, supra note 8, at 405, 410.
The trend shows no signs of abating. By the year 1984, it should be possible to
purchase 50 to 100 billion instructions for one dollar, the cost further decreasing to
two billion per penny by the year 2000. See F. GRUENBERGER, supra note 8, at 7.
11. French, White House Advisors Urge National Information Policy, Cite
Merging Technologies, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 31, 1977, at 1, col. 3. (Report to the
President by the Domestic Council Committee on the Right to Privacy addressing in
part the effects of modern computer technology on U.S. business).
12. See FUORI, supra note 2, at 42; Davis, Evolution of Computers, SCIENCE,
March 18, 1978, at 1096-99.
13. Wright, The Datamation 100: The Top 100 U.S. Companies in the DP In-
dustry, DATAMATION, June 1981, at 91 [hereinafter cited as Wright].
14. Weisbecker, The Microcomputer Industry: An Introduction, COMPUTERS
AND PEOPLE, May-June 1980, at 20, 21.
15. In Wright, supra note 13, the author states that "[M]icrocomputer system
revenues (defined as fully configured systems selling for under $15,000) increased
85% in 1980, while word processing systems increased 64% to $881 million and min-
icomputers increased 28% to $8.8 billion." Wright, supra note 13, at 93.
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the market,"0 "and the boom is really just getting under
way."91
Use of service bureaus has also risen prodigiously. In 1976
there were more than 5,000 companies which generated reve-
nues of $5.9 billion.'8
B. Lack of Public Knowledge
Public knowledge of computers has lagged far behind the
new advances in the computer field, creating what one com-
mentator described as "the mystique of the computer."' 9 Even
though computers touch all our lives,20 they remain "a mys-
tery to the public, who may fail to distinguish between incom-
petence and competence, between honorable and dishonorable
programmers, or to recognize fraud."'2' This lack of familiarity
with computer theory and operation, despite the rapidly in-
creasing integration of computers into the mainstream of com-
mercial and private life, explains why society has become so
totally dependent upon the computer.2 2
There are many problems confronting the operator of a
small business who seeks to improve his profit margin by in-
stalling a computer. Frequently, not only does he not know
realistically what to expect from the system, usually he does
not even know how to ask for what he wants. From the point
of view of those who sell and service the computer, the client's
inability to state his needs is one of the most frequent causes
of disagreement between customer and computer merchant.'3
16. For example, in 1977, there were 88 suppliers offering a total of 249 differ-
ent systems. By 1978, it was estimated that there were 750 such suppliers offering a
choice of over 2,000 different systems, an 800% increase. Richman, Firms of All Sizes
Convert to Mini's, DATAMATION, Oct. 1978, at 94.
17. McCartney, supra note 6, at 91. The author also indicates that pharmacies
and insurance brokers are probable future purchasers of small computer systems.
18. Lautenberg, Computing Services: Industry or Coincidence?, COMPUTERS AND
PEOPLE, Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 8.
19. Bigelow, Contract Caveats, DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1970, at 41. Cf. Brown,
Programming: The Quiet Evolution, DATAMATION, March 1979, at 147-49.
20. In the 1970's, it was estimated that one out of every six people was affected
daily by the computer. By 1984, that figure should rise to one out of every two.
Statland, Computers-Their Impact on People's Lives in the 1980's, COMPUTERS AND
PEOPLE, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 17.
21. O'Connor, Computer Professionals: The Need for State Licensing, 18
JURIMETRICS J. 256, 258 (1978).
22. Palmer, Programming: The Profession That Isn't, DATAMATION, April 1975,
at 171. See generally Smith, supra note 6, at 477-78.
23. Kirshner, DP Contract Litigation Viewed as Booming Area, COM-
19831 1069
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However, what the data programmer sees as a failure to com-
municate, the client normally views as necessary reliance upon
the skill and judgment of the "computer expert."
Courts often have noted the extremely complex nature of
the computer industry.2" It also has been the object of criti-
cism by many commentators. 5 It therefore is not surprising
that the purchasers of computer systems and services feel the
need to place themselves in the seemingly capable hands of
the systems and program designer. The consultants, however,
do not seem ready to assume the responsibility placed on
them. Not only does the demand for persons who are knowl-
edgeable about computers far exceed the supply,26 but there
are few industry-wide standards measuring job performance.
In addition, no tests have been developed to measure the indi-
vidual performance of computer programmers.2 7 While pro-
grammers are capable of directing the operations of the actual
computer, they have been criticized as having little under-
standing of how to utilize computers in a profitable business,
or how to make the theoretical possibilities of the computer
applicable to solving a client's actual needs. 8
The difficulties caused by this frequent gap between ex-
pert and layman should be borne by those with a knowledge
of computers-those persons involved with computer sales
and service who represent themselves as knowledgeable in the
PUTERWORLD, Nov. 6, 1978, at 9, col. 1.
24. See Strand Eng'g Co. v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743, 748 (E.D. Mich.
1961). Cf. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d. Cir.
1979); Clements Auto Co. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971); Chatlos
Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979). See also text
accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
25. See generally Chandler, supra note 8, at 405; O'Connor, supra note 21, at
256; Jordon, supra note 1; Smith, supra note 6, at 475; Comment, Imposing Liability
on Data Processing Services-Should California Choose Fraud or Warranty?, 13
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 140 (1972).
26.
Employment of programmers and systems analysts, negligible in 1960,
now totals nearly half a million workers. Despite this growth, the de-
mand still exceeds the supply; as the number of dp installations in-
creases, the number of job openings for programmers and systems ana-
lysts will grow much faster than the rest of the labor force. (U.S. Bureau
of Census, 1980).
Hiltz, The Growing DP Job Market, DATAMATION, April 1981, at 219.
27. See Editorial, Too Young, COMPUTERWORLD, March 26, 1975, at 12, col. 1;
Chandler, supra note 8, at 438.
28. See Statland, supra note 20, at 8.
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field. As the two hypotheticals at the beginning of this com-
ment illustrate, there is a strong need to protect the public
through regulation of computer professionals.
Licensing of computer programmers has been mentioned
with increasing frequency, primarily by those outside the
computer industry.2 9 One critic has commented that licensing
of computer programmers is needed in areas of "critical con-
cern," such as credit information control, hospital apparatus
regulation, and mass transit regulation."0
Since the computer industry is so new and the demand
for data programmers so great, there has been little impetus
to restrict the influx of data programmers into the field. As a
result, licenses, such as the Certificate in Data Processing
(CDP) as proposed by the Institute for the Certification of
Computer Professionals (ICCP), have been ignored. The CDP
title has little bearing on a person's chances for employment
since job competition is virtually nonexistent and the CDP li-
cense elicits little respect in the industry. 1 Outside the indus-
try, the public already views computer personnel with respect,
making a license unnecessary in this regard.2
No state has enacted legislation regulating the conduct of
computer industry professionals or requiring that they be li-
censed.88 Though such public protection methods are ulti-
mately inevitable as the industry begins to slow its growth
somewhat and job competition increases, 4 other ways must be
found to insulate the public from over-reliance upon the com-
29. See generally Note, A Model Professional and Occupational Licensing Act,
5 HAav. JON. LEGis. 67 (1967); Hoffman, Scott Springer, A Model Health Profession
Act and State Regulatory Policy, 28 AD. L. Rav. 167 (1976); Raskin, Do Special In-
terests Control the Licensing?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, at 6E, col. 3; Arnst, SCDP
Licensing Proposal Splits DP Community in 1975, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 31, 1975
and Jan. 5, 1976, at 9, col. 1; O'Connor supra note 21, at 261.
30. O'Connor, supra note 21, at 256. The author argues for mandatory licensing
of those data processors who control systems related to other "critical areas" such as
air traffic control systems, criminal information systems, systems which directly affect
financial or economic status, systems which catalogue substantial amounts of infor-
mation regarding individuals, and systems which analyze data regarding individuals
or their characteristics, such as personal credit reporting services and educational
testing services. Id. at 263-67.
31. DP Too Young for Licensing, ICCP Officer Says, COMPUTERWORLD, March
5, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
32. See O'Connor, supra note 21, at 263.
33. Introduction, Computer Personnel Regulation and Licensing Information,
[1972-1979 Transfer Binder] 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. § 7.3 at 1 (1978).
34. See O'Connor, supra note 21, at 256.
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puter professionals.
C. Inadequacy of Present Remedies
1. Contract
The client of a systems designer or the purchaser of a
computer system who relies upon contractual remedies to re-
dress his grievances may have less protection than he ex-
pected. A manufacturer may disclaim most, if not all, express
or implied warranties in the sale of computers. 5 The Uniform
Commercial Code permits warranty disclaimers provided they
mention "merchantability" and are conspicuous if in writing."
Such broad disclaimer clauses are common in the computer
industry. 7 These contracts frequently contain merger clauses
which state that the written contract is the parties' final
"complete and exclusive agreement."8
A computer manufacturer or service bureau can further
restrict a consumer's remedies by contractually limiting the
remedies in the sales agreement.3 9 Courts have been tolerant
of virtually any such contractual limitations that have not
been patently unconscionable or contracts of adhesion.4' For
example, the contractual limitations on the statute of limita-
tions in a services contract have been held valid when re-
stricted to as short a time as one year.4 1 Given the industry-
wide acceptance of such contracts in the computer field, some
35. Spanner and Mark, Sharpening Your Clause, DATAMATION, Aug. 1980, at
114, 115.
36. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977).
37. See Spanner and Mark, supra note 35, at 116.
38. Id. at 115. See Int'l Business Mach. Corp. v. Catamore Enter., 548 F.2d 1065
(1st Cir. 1976), and infra note 41.
39. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1977).
40. See Spanner and Mark, supra note 35, at 115. But see U.C.C. § 2-719(2)
(1977).
41. See Int'l Business Mach. Corp. v. Catamore Enter., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.
1976) for a typical agreement in this area. There, the plaintiff, a wholesale distributor
of religious jewelry, was barred from bringing suit for breach of contract, negligence,
fraud, and misrepresentation because of its "Agreement for IBM Systems Engineer-
ing Services" with IBM. The contract provided that it was "the complete and exclu-
sive statement of the agreement between the parties, which supersedes all proposals
oral or written and all other communications between the parties," and that IBM's
liability for damages would "not exceed the total amount paid for services," that this
was the buyer's "exclusive remedy," that IBM would not be liable for any lost profits
or other consequential damages, and that no action "arising out of the services under
this Agreement may be brought by either party more than one year after the cause of
action has accrued." Id. at 1070.
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other form of public protection is needed.
2. Tort
The consumer who wishes to bring an action in tort for
negligence may encounter difficulties with the statute of limi-
tations. Generally, the statute does not begin to run until
some damage has occurred.4 California has adopted a similar
rule to the effect that the statute begins to run at the occur-
rence of the last essential element of the cause of action.43 In
the case of computer negligence, this last element will likely
be the installation of either the improper system or the im-
properly designed program. California has a two year statute
of limitations for such actions" which applies whether the
plaintiff elects a tort action for negligent injury to intangibles,
or a contract action for breach of an implied duty of care.45
The rule that the statute begins to run at the time of the
negligent act is disadvantageous to the potential plaintiff for
two reasons. First, it may sometimes take the computer own-
er-user more than two years to discover that the system as
designed for his needs is inadequate. Second, it probably will
take more than two years from the time of the negligent act
for the computer-owner to complain to the manufacturer or
service bureau and have them attempt to rectify the
problem."
Another problem facing the potential tort plaintiff is
proving that the defendant breached a duty of care owed the
42. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 144 (4th ed. 1971).
43. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart and Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 187, 491 P.2d
421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 340, 68
Cal. Rptr. 617 (1968). For a discussion of various exceptions to this rule, see Warring-
ton v. Charles Pfizer and Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567-80, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969).
44. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West 1982), provides in part for a two year
limitation upon "lAin action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded
upon an instrument of writing ...." (Emphasis added). This code section has been
deemed a "catch-all" for unusual tort actions not otherwise provided for. 2B. WrrKMIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 1172 (2d ed. 1970).
45. Neel v. Magana, et al., 6 Cal. 3d 187, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837; Alter
v. Michael, 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966); Moonie v. Lynch,
256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967).
46. In Triangle, a contract was entered into on December 5, 1970, and the
system was installed in January, 1971. Though the system never worked properly,
plaintiff did not file its initial complaint until August 14, 1975. In Int'l Business
Mach. v. Catamore Enter., 548 F.2d 1065, a "Machine Service Agreement" was signed
in September of 1968. After much disagreement between the parties over the insuffi-
ciency of the system, suit was not filed until October of 1972. See text accompanying
notes 26-28 supra and 98-117 infra.
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plaintiff. The general standard of care is usually stated as that
of the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence." ' However,
this standard is very difficult to establish since the industry
has so few standards by which to measure performance.a One
possible remedy is to hold those who service and sell com-
puter goods and services to the elevated responsibility of the
professional and, as such, liable for malpractice.
III. ESTABLISHING THE TORT
A. Case Precedence
The courts have yet to fully accept the tort of computer
malpractice in relation to computer merchants or consultants.
No court has expressly held that a plaintiff may bring an ac-
tion for computer malpractice. Only a few have even discussed
it.
The computer malpractice claim was given short shrift by
the U.S. District Court for New Jersey in Chatlos Systems v.
National Cash Register Corp."9 Plaintiff, Chatlos, was in-
volved in the design and manufacture of cable pressurization
equipment for the telecommunications industry. Defendant,
National Cash Register (NCR), designed, manufactured and
sold computer systems, programs and services. In July of
1974, Chatlos signed a Systems Services Agreement for the
sale of an NCR computer system to be operational within six
months.50 The system had problems from the time it was in-
stalled; attempts were made to correct the system until Sep-
tember of 1976, when relations between the parties ceased.
The court dismissed Chatlos' computer malpractice claim
in the first footnote of the opinion. Answering plaintiff's claim
that those who sell and service computer systems have an ele-
vated responsibility, the court found that the technical com-
plexity and relative importance to the business community of
selling and servicing computer systems was insufficient justifi-
47. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 32, at 150.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28; and infra text accompanying
notes 98-117.
49. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 1979).
50. Id. Chatlos was shortly thereafter approached by Burroughs Corporation, a
major competitor of NCR, who told Chatlos of a more advanced system than the one
NCR had offered. When Chatlos brought this conversation to the attention of NCR, a
substitution was made, and a more advanced disc system replaced the old magnetic
ledger system in the agreement. Id.
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cation to impose greater potential liability." The "invitation
to create a new tort," was also rejected due to the absence of
any "sound precedential authority." ' 2 Despite this scant treat-
ment of the issue, the court did not seem adverse to the no-
tion of computer malpractice per se, and perhaps would have
confronted the question directly had the case not been de-
cided on contractual grounds. 58
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directly
addressed the issue of the professional liability of computer
programmers in Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v.. Honeywell,
Inc." and denied a malpractice claim. Plaintiff, Triangle Un-
derwriters, was a general agent for many insurance compa-
nies,55 and had used computers to process the large quantities
of paper involved in the business. In April of 1970, Triangle
signed a lease agreement with Honeywell for a new system to
replace its IBM system, and then elected to purchase the
hardware that December." The new system was installed57
but it was immediately apparent that the system was not
working properly. Although Honeywell's personnel continued
to work on the system until sometime in 1972, Triangle's com-
puter system never functioned properly. Triangle filed suit in
August, 1975, seeking damages for fraud, breach of contract
and warranties, and negligence. On appeal the court held that
all counts other than those for fraud were barred by the New
York statutes of limitation.'"
The court viewed the contract as principally for the sale
of goods, and saw no justification for the imposition of profes-
51. Id. at 740-41 n.1.
52. Id.
53. Chatlos Systems was awarded $120,710.92 by the federal district court for
direct breach of warranties and consequential damages. As of this writing, the case is
still in litigation over the question of damages.
54. 604 F.2d 737.
55. Id. at 739. Triangle's duties included the placement of casualty insurance
from brokers, and assuming the responsibility of binding the carriers, remitting the
premiums to the carriers, keeping records of the payments, extensions, cancellations,
credits, remitting commissions to brokers, issuing policies, and updating all records.
56. Id. at 740. Under the agreement, Honeywell employees were to install the
system and train Triangle employees in its use, so they could eventually take over
complete operation of the system.
57. As Robert Weinstein, Triangle's president, described the occasion, "[A]
baby was being born, and I was very concerned with the success of that baby and how
healthy it was going to be." Id. at 740.
58. Id. at 741.
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sional responsibilities on an equipment merchant. 5 As part of
its cause of action Triangle sought to use the "continuous
treatment" concept,60 usually applicable only to physicians
and patients, to extend the statute of limitations. Under the
continuous treatment doctrine the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the physician-patient relationship has
ended, rather than at the last date of the malpractice. The
court acknowledged that New York courts had extended that
doctrine to other professionals such as attorneys,"' archi-
tects,62 and accountants, 8 but stressed that such extensions
had been based upon the special relationship of trust and reli-
ance that existed between the lay client and the profes-
sional." The court dismissed the plaintiff's professional liabil-
ity claim, finding that there was "wholly lacking in the case at
bar that professional relationship upon which application of
the doctrine, in any context, depends."'1 5 The court noted that
although Triangle had relied upon Honeywell's expertise, that
reliance was insufficient to warrant application of the continu-
ous treatment concept. The court feared that to do so would
open a Pandora's box of uncertainty and wreak havoc on the
areas to which the statutes of limitation offer stability.66
It is significant that the court placed such emphasis on
the element of reliance. Though in this particular case it
found the reliance to be insufficient, the court seems to have
opened the door to computer malpractice at least in those
cases where the reliance is substantial.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York found sufficient reliance in F & M Shaefer Corp. v. Elec-
59. Id. at 745.
60. Id. at 744.
61. See Crago v. Robertson, 49 A.D.2d 645, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1975); Siegel v.
Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968). In Siegel, the court noted that "the
client is hardly in a position to know the intricacies of the practice or whether the
necessary steps in the action have been taken. For better or worse, the client must
depend on his attorney to pursue the litigation diligently and according to the rules."
288 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
62. County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d
998 (1974). In that case the court observed that "generally the client is required to
rely almost totally on the professional advice of the architect. He must have confi-
dence in him and place his full trust in him." Id. at 1002.
63. Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 377 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1973).
64. 604 F.2d at 745.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 746.
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tronic Data Systems. 7 The court declared that computer spe-
cialists and their clients have a "special relationship" that is
based upon the client's reliance on the advice and knowledge
of the data programming expert.68
F & M Shaefer and Electronic Data Systems (EDS) en-
tered into a seven year contract in 1969 for the development
and supply of data processing services.s9 Under the agree-
ment, EDS operated Shaefer's old computer system while de-
veloping a faster, more modern system to meet Shaefer's data
processing needs. EDS ran this new system for Shaefer until
August, 1976, when the turnover was completed. The system
never functioned properly, however. Shaefer alleged that EDS
did not adhere to the contract, that EDS had developed a
faulty system, and that EDS had fraudulently induced
Shaefer to enter the contract.
The court found that the reliance creating the "special
relationship" was based on the technical language used by
programmers, the complexity of which prevented the client
from giving informed consent to the programmer's work.70
The court stressed that, because of this special relationship,
any fraud or negligence would probably not be discovered un-
til after the termination of the relationship. Consequently, the
court ruled that the statute of limitations should begin to run
only after the continuing relationship had ended.7 ' The case,
however, was not decided on the professional negligence issue
because it ultimately settled out of court.
Thus, no court has specifically upheld the tort of com-
puter malpractice. The emphasis on the reliance factor, how-
ever, has opened the door to the tort, at least for those clients
who have "sufficiently" relied upon the skill and judgment of
the computer expert. Future cases must develop some stan-
dard by which the sufficiency of this reliance can be judged.
67. No. 76-3982, slip op. at -- (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 1977).
68. Id. slip op. at --. See also Judge Rules DPers Open to Malpractice
Claims, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
69. F & M Shaefer Corp. v. Elec. Data Systems Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988, 989
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). This case decided a counterclaim for replevin advanced by E.D.S.
against Shaefer's original complaint.
70. No. 76-3982, slip op. at
71. Id. slip op. at -
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B. Professional Liability Defined
Black's Law Dictionary defines "profession" as a "voca-
tion or occupation requiring special, usually advanced, educa-
tion and skill .... The labor and skill involved in a profession
is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical
or manual."7M  Professionals are held to a higher duty of care
than laymen primarily because of this emphasis on the profes-
sional's judgment.73 Absent an express understanding to the
contrary, a professional is held to the standard of skill and
knowledge which is commonly possessed by members in good
standing of that profession. If a professional represents that
he has greater expertise in a certain area than is usually pos-
sessed by members of his profession, he will be held to that
higher level of responsibility.75
The following factors are characteristic of a profession:
(1) the requirement of extensive learning and training; (2) a
code of ethics imposing standards above those normally toler-
ated in the marketplace; (3) a disclipinary system for mem-
bers who breach this code; (4) a primary emphasis on social
responsibility over strictly individual gain, and the corre-
sponding duty of its members to behave as members of a dis-
ciplined and honorable profession; and (5) the prerequisite of
a license prior to admission to practice.76 Applying this fairly
strict standard, it is clear that data programmers are
professionals.
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1089 (5th ed. 1979). The definition notes that the
term originally applied only to theology, law, and medicine, but has been applied to
other vocations to which the extension of science and learning implies the attainment
of special knowledge rather than mere skill.
73. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, Comment a (1977). Sec-
tion 299A defines a professional as possessing a degree of aptitude and competence
not ordinarily found in the reasonable man, but which stems from acquired learning,
special training and experience.
74. Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 626 (1973); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299, Comments a and e (1977); See also W. PROSSER,
supra note 42, § 32, at 161-62. See generally T. ROADY, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 4
(1960).
75. See PROSSER, supra note 42, § 32, at 161; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 299A, Comment a (1977).
76. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Freeman, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336, 339 (1974). See
supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. See generally R. ROUND, THE LAWYER
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 4-10 (1953) for the traditional definition of
"professional."
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1. Training
Data programmers meet the requirement of formal train-
ing. As selling points, both manufacturers and service bureaus
stress the qualifications and skills of their employees." As the
industry continues to grow in size and complexity, the skill
and knowledge of those employed must keep pace.
2. Code of Ethics
The computer industry has many voluntary codes of eth-
ics and conduct.7 8 Most stress adherence to a uniform, profes-
sional standard as essential to the attainment of public recog-
nition of computer personnel as professionals. 9 Moreover,
these codes recognize the high degree of trust and reliance in-
volved in the relationship between data processor and client.80
3. Disciplinary System
In addition, several proposed disciplinary systems already
exist. For example, in its Disciplinary Rules, the Association
for Computing Machinery's Code of Conduct provides that
"[a]n ACM member shall not attempt to exonerate himself
from, or to limit, his liability to his clients for his personal
malpractice."81
77. See Association for Computing Machinery, Proposed Code of Conduct,
[1972-79 Transfer Binder] 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) App. 7-3C at 26 (1979).
78. Codes are collected at [1972-79 Transfer Binder] 5 COMPUTER L. SEnv. (CAL-
LAGHAN) App. 7-3C at 1-39 (1968-80).
79. The Preamble of the Association for Computing Machinery's proposed Code
of Conduct is indicative of this desire to be viewed as a bona fide profession: "Recog-
nition of professional status by the public depends not only on skill and dedication,
but also on adherence to a recognized code of conduct." Association for Computing
Machinery, Code of Conduct-- 5 COMPUTER L. SERv., supra note 78, at 14.
80. See, e.g., Data Processing Management Association Code of Conduct: "The
personal accountability of consultants and technical experts is especially important
because of the positions of unique trust inherent in their advisory roles. Conse-
quently, they are accountable for seeing to it that known limitations of their work are
fully disclosed, documented and explained." D.R.3.1. 3 [1972-79 Transfer Binder] 5
COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) App. 7-3C at 8 (1974).
81. Association for Computing Machinery, Code of Conduct, D.R.3.1. 3 [1972-79
Transfer Binder) 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) App. 7-3C at 29 (1979) (empha-
sis added). It should be noted that those codes of conduct and disciplinary rules do
not yet apply to the industry as a whole, but only to those members of the various
professional organizations propounding them. It is expected, however, that member-
ship in these groups will increase as employment in the industry becomes more com-
petitive. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
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4. Social Responsibility and Duty to Behave
Accordingly
The various codes of ethics and conduct also demonstrate
the industry's awareness of its duty to subvert individual gain
to a wider social responsibility.82 This attitude has not yet had
the chance to pervade the profession to the same degree as it
has with the three "traditional" professions: law, medicine,
and the ministry. Since this duty has come to be recognized
among several of the "newer" professions, such as accounting
and architecture, it will likely also be recognized among com-
puter personnel.
5. Licensing
Although the various codes of ethics show that data pro-
grammers tend to hold themselves out as professionals, no
state has required licensing to date. Much of the current op-
position to licensing comes from data programmers. They
favor voluntary certification, if anything, and view legislation
requiring licensing as an unnecessary intrusion into the devel-
opment of their new profession." As discussed above, licens-
ing is a necessary means of safeguarding the public by provid-
ing industry-wide standards of conduct. Several
commentators predict both that states will require licensing
and that data programmers will attain professional status.84
C. Reliance
In addition to superior skill and knowledge, other factors
which courts have discussed in finding that a person is to be
held to the standard of a professional include whether the
person continually exercises his judgment in carrying out his
duties"5 and the degree of reliance placed upon that judg-
82. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
83. See, for example the Data Processor Managing Association's position on li-
censing-legislation that would require licensing for employment and operation of
computers would be too difficult to administer and would be detrimental to the devel-
opment of the profession. 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. App. 7-3C at 17-18, supra note 78, at
14. But cf. O'Connor, supra note 21, at 256.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34. See generally Nycum, Liability
for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RuTGERs J. or CoMPUTERs, TECHNOLOGY
AND LAW 1, 9 (1979); O'Connor, supra note 21; Chandler, supra note 8.
85. Comment, supra note 75, at 631.
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ment.s6 Courts have designated as professionals physicians,
surgeons, dentists, pharmacists, attorneys, architects, engi-
neers, accountants, abstractors of title, oculists, optometrists,
x-ray operators, pilots, and those involved in some skilled
trades."7 California courts long have recognized the fiduciary
relationship that arises between a professional and his client
due to this reliance.88
The reliance which a purchaser of computer sales and ser-
vices must necessarily give to expert judgment has been ad-
dressed by several courts. As early as 1961 in Strand v. Libra-
scope, Inc.,89 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan commented that computer consumers rely more
upon the knowledge and good faith of the manufacturer than
in any ordinary contractual relationship since the potential
purchaser is not in a position to make a prior investigation of
the product.9 0
Reliance was the key issue in Clements Auto Co. v. Ser-
vice Bureau Corp.e1 The plaintiff claimed that it had been de-
86. Id. This reliance has been judicially recognized in many "professions" in
California. Neel v. Magan, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971) (at-
torney); Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (attor-
ney); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962) (attorney); Bedolla v. Logan & Frazier, 52 Cal. App. 3d
118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975) (accountant); Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64
Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967) (accountant); Cooper v. Jeune, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1976) (architect). In all these cases, the reliance between professional and
client was a major factor in imposing the "time of discovery" rule to the applicable
statute of limitations. See infra text accompanying notes 131-138.
87. W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 32, at 161-62; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A, Comment b (1977).
88. See Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971);
Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 187, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Huysman v.
Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.3d 908 (1936) (physician); Cortelyou v. Imperial Land Co.,
166 Cal. 14, 134 P. 981 (1918) (trustees); Leaf v. San Mateo, 104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 163
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1980) (real estate developer); Bedolla v. Logan and Grazier, 52 Cal.
App. 3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975) (accountant); Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App.
2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1971); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones and Templeton, Inc., 262
Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968) (stock broker).
89. 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
90. Id. at 752. The court found that,
under the singular circumstances of this case, where reliance was placed
upon the expertise of an established concern that had the required in-
formation in its exclusive possession, the manufacturer was under an ob-
ligation to indicate the state of development of the new product in order
to avoid misleading impressions created by its partial disclosure and its
unqualified statements.
Id. at 753.
91. 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'g modified, 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mich.
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frauded by a computer service bureau, an IBM subsidiary.
The court noted the inequality of knowledge between the par-
ties, finding that the defendant was clearly an expert in the
computer field and so must be held to an elevated level of
responsibility.2 It was this same reliance which prompted the
court in F & M Schaefer Corp. to find the necessary special
relationship to exist between professionals and their clients.
In a similar vein, it was due to a lack of the necessary degree
of reliance that the court in Triangle Underwriters declined
to recognize plaintiff's claim of computer malpractice.
The complexity of the computer field necessitates this cli-
ent reliance on the computer consultants and data program-
mers, and that industry has become so complex that even its
terminology has come under judicial attack. Though ostensi-
bly lighthearted dicta, there can be little doubt as to the seri-
ousness underlying Judge Edenfield's views in Honeywell, Inc.
v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc.:as
[I]n the computer age, lawyers and courts need no
longer feel ashamed or even sensitive about the charge,
often made, that they confuse the issue by resort to legal
"jargon," law Latin or Norman French. By comparison,
the misnomers and industrial shorthand of the computer
would make the most esoteric legal writing seem as clear
and lucid as the Ten Commandments or the Gettysburg
Address; and to add to this Babel, the experts in the com-
puter field, while using exactly the same words, uniformly
disagree as to precisely what they mean. 4
In California, analogies can be made between the com-
puter field and many other occupations which the courts have
deemed "professions" because of the complexity of the field
and the resulting client reliance.' 5 Thus, the computer area
1969).
92. Id. at 183. Consequently, the court found that Service Bureau Corporation's
statements regarding the overall usefulness of its system, the presence of error-con-
trol features, the properties of the Flexowriters and the necessity of automating SM's
accounting were all statements upon which SM, with its limited knowledge of com-
puters and data processing systems, could reasonably rely, given the superior knowl-
edge of SBC.
Id. at 184.
93. 317 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
94. Id. at 408.
95. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (attorneys). A similar degree of reliance has
been found when dealing with other "professions." U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-
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satisfies all the prerequisites for the imposition of the stan-
dard as a "profession," and there is strong precedence for ex-
tending professional liability to those who render computer
sales and services.
D. Elements of Professional Malpractice
There are four elements to any negligence action. The de-
fendant has (1) a duty of care which, either by his action or
failure to act, (2) has been breached, the breach being the (3)
proximate cause of (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries6
Each of these elements presents problems when applied to the
tort of computer malpractice.
1. Duty of Care
Since data programmers and service consultants are pro-
fessionals, 97 they have a duty to conduct themselves as reason-
able persons having the skill and learning commonly pos-
sessed by members of the profession in good standing. 8 To
whom is this duty owed? This question has been rephrased in
the following manner: Does the person stand "in any such re-
lation to the plaintiff as to create any legally recognized obli-
gation of conduct for his benefit?"99 This duty certainly ex-
tends to the client who must rely upon the computer
professional's skilled judgment and experience.100 Whether
this duty extends to third parties, however, is less certain.
Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 594-95, 463 P.2d 770, 777, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425 (1970)
(insurance agents); Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 534, 375 P.2d
33, 36. 25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68 (1962) (escrow agents); Cortelyou v. Imperial Land Co.,
166 Cal. 14, 20, 134 P. 981, 983 (1913) (trustees); Cooper v. Jeune, 56 Cal. App. 3d
860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976) (architects); Stuart v. Crestview Mut. Water Co., 34
Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973) (engineers); Cook v. Redwood Empire
Title Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1969) (title companies); Moonie v.
Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967) (accountants). The California
legislature also has extended professional status, with the accompanying liability for
breach of professionalism to investment counselors. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3372 (West
1970); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 726, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222, 246 (1968) (stock brokers).
96. W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 30, at 143; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 281 (1977).
97. See Jordon, supra note 1; W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 32, at 161-62; supra
notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 32, at 162.
99. Id. at 245.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 86-96.
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In the wake of Justice Cardozo's decision in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,'°' holding that there is no liability owed by
accountants to creditors and investors who have relied on the
accountants' certifications, computer programmers may not
owe a duty of care to third parties.1 '02 One commentator has
hypothesized that, because the Ultramares principle has been
applied to accountants, lawyers, and other professionals, it
also might be applied to computer programmers, since they
too deal with abstractions not necessarily subject to physical
limitations. 03
This rule probably would not prevent liability to third
parties in California. Lucas v. Hamm,10 4 concerning the liabil-
ity of lawyers, developed a balancing test to determine the lia-
bility of professionals for their negligence to third parties not
in privity."' Under Lucas the elements to be considered in-
clude "the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the de-
gree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury, and the policy of preventing future harm."10 Ap-
plying these factors to the computer field, the computer pro-
fessional could well be held liable to third parties.10 7
101. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R. 1639 (1931).
102. An example of an aggrieved third party would be a party who relies upon
the reports issued by an insurance agent who utilizes a data processing system. The
system had been programmed by an independent service bureau. The third party
becomes involved in an auto accident and when he files his claim, discovers that the
negligently-programmed computer system never informed him of the lapse of his pol-
icy. The question in this case would be whether the service bureau can be held liable
to the third party.
103. Nycum, supra note 85.
104. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962).
105. Nycum, supra note 85, at 11.
106. 56 Cal. 2d at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
107. See generally Nycum, supra note 85. See also Indep. School Dist. No. 454
v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1973), where the defen-
dant STC had processed statistical data for a consulting firm which had been engaged
by the plaintiff to appraise the value of a school building. The building was underin-
sured as a result of the inaccuracy of STC's figures. The building was later destroyed
by fire. In holding STC liable for its negligence, the court stated that liability may lie
for "providing inaccurate information which was relied on and caused economic loss,
although there was no direct contractual relationship between the parties." Id. at
1097. Noting that STC could expect that the plaintiff would rely upon the data, the
court stated that "recovery by a foreseeable user will promote cautionary techniques
among computer operators." Id. at 1098; accord, M. Miller Co. v. Cent. Contra Costa
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2. Breach of the Duty of Care
Several difficult issues are raised in determining when the
computer programmer's duty of care is breached. First and
foremost is the lack of any real standards in the field itself. 08
Because the computer industry is so new and is constantly
changing equipment and applications, an injured plaintiff may
encounter trouble proving the defendant violated a duty of
care. For example, a computer error can occur in as short a
period as one nanosecond, 0 9 making detection of the malfunc-
tion very difficult. Proof of the error may lie undetected in the
computer banks, much the same as proof of an accountant's
error may lie undetected in the columns of a ledger.
The problem is not completely insurmountable. If a con-
tract is involved, its terms may be the best guide as to what
should be the standard of care." 0 If the data programmer be-
longs to an organization with a code of ethics, or if there are
any licensing statutes in force, these may supply a minimum
standard of care."' The standards of care may also be estab-
lished by focusing on the extent to which the newly installed
system was tested for potential and existing problems. 1 2
Though the installer of the system satisfied his contractual
obligations, he still may be held to a higher standard of care.
Because of the reliance placed upon his skill and knowledge,
he may have an implied professional duty to test the system
beyond that minimum required by the contract.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur probably does not apply
due to the complexity and unsureness of the field. In order to
use res ipsa loquitur successfully, the plaintiff must show that
the injury or damage was such that it normally would not
have occurred in the absence of negligence, that the instru-
mentality, i.e., the computer, was in the defendant's control,
and that the plaintiff was not contributorally negligent." 3
Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961). See generally Chandler,
supra note 8, at 413.
108. See supra text accompanying note 27.
109. See Chandler, supra note 8, at 411. See generally O'Connor, supra note 21;
Jordon, supra note 1; Nycum, supra note 85.
110. T. RoADY, supra note 75, at vi-vii.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 299A, Comment f (1977): "Licens-
ing statutes, or those requiring a basic knowledge of science for the practice of a
profession, may provide such a minimum standard."
112. See Jordon, supra note 1.
113. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 39 at 214.
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Courts must recognize the reliability of the computer before
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will be applied."' This has not
yet occurred.11
One advantage in proving the negligent act is the com-
puter's ability to reconstruct the exact steps leading to the
damage caused by the system's program. This characteristic
actually permits a higher level of accuracy in identifying the
negligent act than is normally the case in negligence
actions.116
3. Proximate Cause
To be liable for malpractice, the defendant's negligent act
or failure to act must have been the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries or damages. 1 7 Mere negligence will not cre-
ate a cause of action unless this causal relationship is
shown." Proximate cause may be defined succinctly as that
cause which produces the injury in a continuous sequence, un-
broken by any intervening causes, and without which the in-
jury would not have occurred. 9 In the area of computer sys-
tems design and research, there do not seem to be any special
problems with proximate cause which cannot be treated ade-
quately under existing tort doctrines. Generally, it easily can
be shown that it was the computer system which caused the
injury. For example, if a business's accounting operations are
handled by a data processing system, it is likely that overbil-
lings and delayed payments are due to a malfunction in the
computer. In short, the plaintiff alleging computer malprac-
114. Id.
115. In Post City State Bank v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973),
the court refused to impose liability for negligence upon the owner of a computer
system, the breakdown of which caused the loss of two checks. One commentator has
suggested the rationale for the court's conclusion was that the computer used was not
sufficiently reliable to hold the owner liable for its breakdown. See Chandler, supra
note 8, at 412; Jordon, supra note 1.
116. See Jordon, supra note 1, at 12.
117. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 42, at 244-45; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 430 (1977). A necessary causal link between the negligent act and the injury
must be shown. Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433, 218 P.2d 17 (1950)
Hawthorne v. Siegel, 88 Cal. 159, 163, 25 P. 1114 (1891); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 915-17, 454-62; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON LAW OF DAMAGES § 73 at 261-
63 (1935).
118. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 42 at 244-45.
119. Id.; Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674 (D.C.Cir. 1963). See also Nycum, supra
note 85 at 14.
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tice will seek to prove that, but for the defendant's negligent
act or omission, he would have derived measurably better re-
sults from the defendant's services.
4. Damages
In tort actions, the general rule in California allows the
recovery of damages which will compensate the plaintiff for
all losses proximately caused by the negligent act, whether or
not such losses were foreseeable. 1 0
In computer malpractice actions, the plaintiff should only
be awarded damages for the expenses he would have incurred
in implementing a reasonable alternative system, if this ex-
ceeds his original installation costs. In addition, the plaintiff
should be able to recover provable lost profits during the time
the defective system impaired the plaintiff's business opera-
tions, that is, those which can be demonstrated with reasona-
ble certainty. 12 1
A problem of proof arises concerning this limitation on
recovery. The same difficulties which were present in deter-
mining the proper standard of care for the computer profes-
sional's conduct also arise in establishing the "reasonableness"
of the alternative. Given the lack of industry standards and
the inexperience of most plaintiffs in this type of cause of ac-
tion, it will be difficult to prove that the alternative was rea-
sonable. The professional does not guarantee a particular re-
sult.122 Rather, the soundness of his design for the client
depends upon the soundness of the reasonable alternatives.2 3
Expert testimony is necessary in order to find the alternatives
which would have provided better results for the client. 12 4 The
expert must testify to his own interpretation of the client's
needs, the feasibility of attaining alternative systems in the
market at the time the negligent design occurred, cost factors,
and the risks involved in the alternative system not entailed
120. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 (West 1983).
121. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 25-29 (1935); Story
Parchment Co. v. Patterson Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). This limitation is
akin to the contract damages limitation on lost profits, where only those damages
reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting are allowed. Morello Growers Grape
Prod. Ass'n, 82 Cal. App. 2d 365, 375, 186 P.2d 463, 469 (1947); Brunvold v. Johnson,
36 Cal. App. 2d 226, 230, 97 P.2d 489, 491 (1939).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 107-15.
124. FED. R. Evm. 702.
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in the system actually rendered to the client. If a client con-
tracts for a business system which is incapable of handling
payroll operations but, in hindsight, should have included
such functions, how should the client's damages be measured?
Under the conventional "out of pocket" measure of tort
damages, a plaintiff recovers an amount of damages to make
him whole, i.e., the cost of adding additional payroll functions
to his system.1 25 However, this measure seems inequitable to
the defendant because the plaintiff did receive what he bar-
gained for-a system without payroll-handling capabilities.2 8
Therefore, under an ordinary measure of tort damages, the
plaintiff would be unjustly enriched in an amount equal to the
difference between a system with payroll handling capabilities
and a system without such abilities.
Holding the plaintiff to a strict "out-of-pocket rule" os-
tensibly denies the plaintiff recovery because he has not "lost"
anything. But the plaintiff has been harmed. But for the de-
fendant's negligent appraisal of his client's needs, and the de-
fendant's failure to satisfy those needs, the client would have
contracted for the system capable of handling his business op-
eration. Thus, the plaintiff's compensable damages lie in his
having been counseled to buy an inadequate system, one he
would not have purchased had the computer expert not acted
negligently.
In this situation, the client's damages should be limited
to the excess of the cost of implementing the proper alterna-
tive system, at the time the system should have been discov-
ered, over the cost of installing the original system, plus inci-
dental expenses and ascertainable lost profits resulting from
125. See CAL. Civ. CoDz § 3333 (West 1983). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) Op ToRTS §§ 901, 903, 905, 906 (1977).
126. See Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954), where plaintiff
hired defendant, a soil driller, to test for the pressure of fill on lots which plaintiff
planned to buy. The defendants negligently reported that there was much less fill
than actually existed. The trial court awarded plaintiff damages measured by the in-
creased cost of structural footing required due to the fill. In reversing this measure of
damages, the California Supreme Court found that the defendant had not insured
against the costs of the building foundations. The cost of proper foundations was
inevitable since fill was a natural characteristic of the land. Accordingly, the court
allowed compensable damages only to the extent that the defendants' negligent re-
port induced the plaintiff to purchase the lots for more than their actual value. No
damages would be awarded if it turned out that the lots were actually worth what the




the use of the negligently designed system. In this way, the
plaintiff will recover an amount reflecting his actual losses and
the defendant will be relieved of the duty of guaranteeing his
results.
E. The Effect of Computer Malpractice on the Statute of
Limitations
One of the more important aspects of an action for com-
puter malpractice is the effect it will have on the applicable
statute of limitation. In actions based on ordinary negligence,
the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the neg-
ligent act or omission. 27 An exception to this rule is followed
in malpractice cases: the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered,
the injury.2 8 This rule is based upon the client's reliance upon
the professional's judgment, and the resulting fiduciary duty
of the professional to the client.'2 9 If the rules applicable to
ordinary negligence applied, it is quite possible that the stat-
ute may have already run before the plaintiff is aware that he
has a cause of action.
In California, this rule has been applied to all actions for
professional malpractice.1o In Neel v. Magana'5 ' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court set down three justifications for this "dis-
covery" rule, all of which are applicable to computer profes-
sionals. First, after restating the professional's elevated duty
of care to use the skill, prudence, and diligence commonly ex-
ercised by practitioners of his profession, the court noted that
127. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 31, at 144: "[T]he statute of limitations
does not begin to run against a negligence action until some damage has occurred."
See also Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 187, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
128. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 31, at 144. See also Elec. Equip. Express
v. Donald M. Seiler and Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 834, 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242 (1981):
"A cause of action for professional malpractice accrues when the plaintiff both sus-
tains appreciable and actual harm and discovers, or with reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the wrongful acts." Accord Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d
453, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
129. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 770, 83
Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970); Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 187, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837(1971); Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 453, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
.130. See Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 187, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971);
Leaf v. San Mateo, 104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1980); Bedolla v. Logan
and Frazier, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975); Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal.
App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967), see also supra text accompanying note 91.
131. 6 Cal. 3d 187, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837.
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the client is often unable to detect the negligence of the pro-
fessional when he sees it."2 Thus, just as the plaintiff "cannot
be expected to know the relative medical merits of alternative
anesthetics, or the various exceptions to the hearsay rule,"88
so too the computer professional's client will likely be unable
to detect a negligently programmed computer program or re-
alize that he has been unwisely counseled by a vendor until
long after the negligent act has occurred.
Second, the court noted that, not only might the client
fail to recognize a negligent act when he sees it, but frequently
he will not even have the chance to see it. This reasoning is
clearly applicable to the computer professional. Not only is
much of the programmer's work performed outside the client's
presence and hidden by confusing technical jargon, but evi-
dence of the malpractice may lie buried deep within the com-
puter's memory, much like the proof of the surgeon's negli-
gence which may not become known until years after the
negligent act.3"
Lastly, the court noted that there exists a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the professional and his client, creating an
obligation to render full and complete disclosure to the client
of all facts which may materially affect his rights and inter-
ests.3 5 The rationale here relates especially well to those com-
puter vendors who advise buyers through wholly-owned sub-
sidiary service bureaus, as was the situation in Clements Auto
Co. v. Service Bureau Corp.3 6 According to the court, the fact
that the client is unaware of the professional's negligence im-
plies a failure to properly disclose. 3 7
If the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the computer client or purchaser discovers or should have dis-
covered the malpractice of the computer vendor or service bu-
reau, then the "discovery" rule will prevent the defendant
from escaping liability for his original breach by a later breach
132. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
133. Id. "If he must ascertain malpractice at the moment of its incidence, the
client must hire a second professional to observe the work of the first, an expensive
and impractical duplication, clearly destructive of the confidential relationship be-
tween the practitioner and the client." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45.
136. 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971). See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.




of his duty to disclose. It is submitted that this will not only
prevent a great deal of inequity between the two parties, but
will also serve to reinforce the public's perception of the pro-
fessional status of the computer industry.
F. Strict Liability Actions Inapplicable
The classification of computer consultants and data pro-
grammers as professionals will result in the likely preclusion
of any kind of strict liability action, that is, liability without
fault. Those who deal with the inexact sciences, such as doc-
tors, lawyers, architects, and engineers, must perpetually exer-
cise their judgment so as to foresee and deal with random fac-
tors which cannot be precisely measured. Consequently, the
professional cannot gauge with complete accuracy how these
factors will affect a given situation. 8s As a result of the impre-
cise nature of their professions, those in the business of selling
professional services are not held liable for any bad results
unless they were negligent."" The general rule in California
was stated by the Supreme Court in Gagne v. Bertran'10 that
those who sell their services for the guidance of others in
their economic, financial, and personal affairs are not lia-
ble in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct
.... Those who hire such persons are not justified in ex-
pecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care
and competence. They purchase service, not insurance.""
Thus, those engaged in service bureau consultation and those
vendors of computer equipment who also provide consulting
services will not be held strictly liable for their negligence.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested by some that in allowing this new
138. See Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 640, 76 N.W. 62, 62 (1898), which ap-
plied this standard to design architects. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 42, §
32, at 161-62.
139. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968), where
the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant, a design consultant, liable for poor design
services. The court held that there could be no strict liability action and that the
plaintiff needed proof of negligence.
140. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487-89, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954). See also Paxton v.
County of Alameda, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1085, 1092
(1952).
141. 43 Cal. 2d at 487-89, 275 P.2d at 20-21.
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tort of computer malpractice, the courts will be opening a ver-
itable "Pandora's Box"" 2 of trouble and uncertainty which
will needlessly burden the courts with complex and confusing
litigation. However, if the injuries and damages arising from
the malpractice of computer professionals are indeed genuine,
then the law is obligated to provide a remedy.1 4 8 With more
and more inexperienced persons entering the computer mar-
ket, persons who cannot be expected to bargain equally with
manufacturers and service bureaus, the law must equitably re-
distribute the burdens."
The cause of action set forth in this comment is a neces-
sary one, and grows more practical every day. Supporting its
implementation are a number of considerations such as the
rapidly increasing role of the computer in our society, the in-
creasing complexity of the field, and the growing necessity of
holding those in the field to an elevated degree of responsibil-
ity commensurate with the increased societal reliance on their
expertise. The profession itself has recognized this new ac-
countability, though somewhat reluctantly, by its various
codes of ethics. Expanding the accountability of computer
professionals will ultimately reduce friction between the par-
ties as those professionals render more satisfactory service to
their clients.
As Dean Prosser has stated, "it is the business of the law
to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a
flood of litigation, and it is a pitiful confession of incompe-
tence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such
grounds. ' '"4 The tort of "computer malpractice" is not in-
tended to place another arrow in the already replete quiver of
the plaintiff's attorney. Rather, it is intended to help alleviate
the difficulties which will likely increasingly arise in dealings
between laymen and computer consultants. The mere novelty
of a claim should never operate as a bar to recovery if the
plaintiff's interests are clearly entitled to protection." Com-
142. See Triangle Underwriters, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). See also supra
text accompanying notes 50-66.
143. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 12, at 51.
144. See Chandler, supra note 8, at 407.
145. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 12, at 51.
146.
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the pro-
gress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in
which the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action,
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puter malpractice should not be seen as an undue overreach-
ing of conventional tort doctrines, but, like the computer age
itself, as an idea whose time has come.
Kevin S. MacKinnon
where none had been recognized before .... The law of torts is anything
but static, and the limits of its development are never set.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 1, at 3-4.
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